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Summary
This report provides an overview of the economy of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) or North Korea, its external economic relations, attempts
at reform, and U.S. policy options.  Along with the United States, North Korea’s
major trading partners — China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia — form the so-
called Six Parties, which are currently engaged in talks to resolve issues raised by the
DPRK’s development of a nuclear weapons program.
The economy of North Korea is of interest to Congress because the it provides
the financial and industrial resources for Pyongyang to develop its military,
constitutes an important “push factor” for potential refugees seeking to flee the
country, creates  pressures for the country to trade in arms and illegal drugs, is a
rationale for humanitarian assistance, is tied to Pyongyang’s program to develop
nuclear energy and bombs, and creates instability that ultimately affects the economy
of South Korea.  The North Korean threat to sell nuclear weapons material could be
driven in part by its need to generate export earnings.  The dismal economic
conditions also foster forces of discontent that potentially could turn against the Kim
regime — especially if knowledge of luxurious lifestyle of communist party leaders
becomes better known or as the poor economic performance hurts even Pyongyang’s
elite.  The North Korean economy also is a target of economic sanctions.
Economic conditions in North Korea have been dismal for those out of the
center of power.  Mass starvation — eased only by international food aid and other
humanitarian assistance — has stalked the countryside.  With the termination of aid
from Russia in the form of fuel and other raw materials at concessional prices,
industrial production in North Korea has shrunk, from 60% of the economy in 1987
to 27% in 2002.  The country has embarked on a program of economic reforms that
include raising wages, allowing prices to better reflect market values, reducing
dependence on rationing of essential commodities, trimming back centralized control
over factory operations, and opening foreign trade zones for international investment.
North Korea has extensive trade relationships with China, South Korea, Japan,
and Russia.  Because of U.S. economic sanctions and lack of normal trade relations
status, U.S. imports from North Korea in 2004 were $1.5 million (organic chemicals)
while U.S. exports in were $23.8 million (cereals, fats/oils, vegetables, baking
ingredients and wares, milled food items, and dairy products).  The DPRK runs a $1
billion deficit per year in its international trade that it funds primarily through
receipts of foreign assistance and various illicit or questionable activities, such as
weapons sales, illegal drugs, and counterfeiting.
In the current Six-Party Talks, economic assistance (including fuel oil) is a
major bargaining chip in seeking the complete dismantling of the DPRK’s nuclear
program.  Economic policy options include normalizing relations with Pyongyang,
negotiating a trade agreement, lifting or increasing economic sanctions, allowing the
DPRK to join international financial institutions, and removing the country from the
terrorism list.  This report will be updated as conditions warrant.
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Most Recent Developments
! January 20, 2006.  China proposed that the six-party talks resume in
February.  North Korea stated that it would not return to the talks
until the United States lifted its financial sanctions on Banco Delta
Asia and on eight North Korean entities for allegedly proliferating
weapons of mass destruction.
! January 10-18,  2006.  Kim Jong-il visited southern China and
Beijing ostensibly to learn how China can help North Korea
improve its economy.  In Beijing, the two countries discussed the
six-party talks dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program.
! January 1, 2006.  The U.N. World Food Program, which was
helping to feed one-third of North Korea’s 22 million people as
recently as August 2005, ended all feeding programs at the request
of the North Korea’s government.
! Fall 2005.  North Korea reportedly revived rationing and rolled back
market reforms (closed private food markets).
! On October 21, 2005, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, the U.S.
Treasury designated eight North Korean entities as proliferators of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.  The action
prohibits all transactions between the designated entities and any
U.S. person and freezes any assets the entities may have under U.S.
jurisdiction.
! On September 15, 2005, the U.S. Treasury designated Banco Delta
Asia SARL as a “primary money laundering concern” under Section
311 of the Patriot Act because it represents an unacceptable risk of
money laundering and other financial crimes.  Treasury stated that
“Banco Delta Asia has been a willing pawn for the North Korean
government to engage in corrupt financial activities through
Macau....”1
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Brief IB98045, Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations — Issues for Congress, both by Larry A.
Niksch.
North Korea at a Glance
Land Area:  120,540 sq km, slightly smaller
than Mississippi
Population:  22.5 million (2002 est.)
Head of State: Kim Jong-il
Capital: Pyongyang
Life expectancy: 62.4 years (2002 est.)
GDP: $22.85 billion at purchasing power parity
in 2003
GDP Per Capita: $1,000 at PPP in 2003
($818 at current prices)
GDP Composition:  agriculture: 30% industry:
39%, services: 31%
Exports: $1,066 million f.o.b. (2003) 
Export Commodities: minerals, metallurgical
products, manufactures (including armaments);
textiles and fishery products
Imports: $12,049 million c.i.f. (2003) 
Import Commodities:  petroleum, coking coal,
machinery and equipment; textiles, grain 
Introduction
The Stalinist state of North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or
DPRK) faces a dilemma as its economy stagnates.  The end of the Cold War negated
its value as a surrogate fighter for the former Soviet Union and China and as a
standard bearer for the international proletarian revolution.  The country’s leaders
in Pyongyang have very limited options remaining as they have placed their nuclear
weapons program on the bargaining table in exchange for economic assistance,
security assurance, and normalization of relations with the United States, Japan, and
South Korea.
In the current negotiations with the DPRK, the United States has five major
policy levers:  economic assistance, economic sanctions, non-proliferation
enforcement, diplomatic isolation, and the threat of preemptive military action.  This
report examines the economic side of U.S. leverage with North Korea.  The security
side is addressed in other CRS reports.2   Here we provide an overview of the North
Korean economy, survey its economic relationships with major trading partners, and
conclude with a discussion of U.S. policy options.  
Information on the DPRK’s economy is scanty and suspect.  The closed nature
of the country and the lack of a comprehensive data-gathering structure using
modern economic concepts and a systematic reporting mechanism make quantitative
assessments difficult.  Still, sufficient information is available to provide a picture
of North Korea that is clear enough
to address different policy paths.
U.S. interest in the moribund
North Korea economy goes beyond
the leverage that economic
assistance provides in the current
negotiations.  The economy
provides the financial and industrial
resources for Pyongyang to develop
its military, constitutes an
important “push factor” for
refugees seeking to flee the
country, creates  pressures for the
country to trade in arms and illegal
drugs, provides the impetus for
humanitarian assistance, is tied to
Pyongyang’s push to develop
nuclear energy and bombs, and
creates instability that ultimately
affects the economy of South
Korea.  The North Korean threat to
sell nuclear weapons material
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seems to be driven in part by its need to generate export earnings to pay for imports.
The dismal economic conditions also foster forces of discontent that potentially
could turn against the ruling regime of Kim Jong-il — especially if knowledge of the
luxurious lifestyle of regime leaders spreads or if the poor economic performance
hurts even Pyongyang’s elite.  The North Korean economy also is a target of U.S.
economic sanctions.
This report notes that the worst of North Korea’s economic crisis seems to have
passed, but the economy is still heavily dependent on foreign assistance to stave off
starvation among a sizable proportion of its people.  Another severe food crisis could
occur with one bad harvest.  About 40% of the population still suffers from
malnutrition.  Currently, Pyongyang’s reforms along with better weather and steady
supplies of food aid are enabling the country to bridge its shortfall between food
production and basic human needs.  However, donor fatigue and competing
humanitarian needs in Africa and elsewhere are depressing current donation levels.
U.S. economic sanctions appear to be having minimal economic effect because the
DPRK can turn to other countries for needed imports.
For the United States, the confrontation with the DPRK centers on security
issues, but any resolution of the problem will likely contain a large economic
component.
Overview of the DPRK Economy
The North Korean economy is one of the world’s most isolated and bleak.3  It
was completely bypassed by the “economic miracles” of the past quarter century that
brought modern economic growth and industrialization to South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Hong Kong, as well as rapid growth and trade liberalization to China,
Thailand, Malaysia and other countries of Asia.  The “Stalinist” North Korean
economy can be characterized by state ownership of means of production,
centralized economic planning and command, and an emphasis on military
development.  The economic system is designed to be self-reliant and closed.  The
irony of the situation is that the longer the economy remains closed, the poorer its
performance and the more dependent the country becomes on the outside world just
to survive.  
Pyongyang has embarked on a series of reforms that may ease the economic
pressures over the long term.  In the near term, however, major portions of the North
Korean population are surviving primarily through transfusions of food and other
economic assistance from abroad. 
During the 1990s, the inefficiencies of North Korea’s centrally planned
economy, especially its promotion of state-owned heavy industries, along with high
military spending — as much as 30% of GDP — joined with drought and floods to
push the economy into crisis.  In addition, the collapse of the Soviet bloc meant the
loss of Russian aid, export markets, and cheap oil.  Trade with the former Soviet
CRS-4
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4, 2003.  Subscription database at 
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6 Chao, Julie.  Economic Devastation Visible in Pyongyang. Korea Is like a Land Time
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7 Watts, Jonathan.  Where Are You, Beloved General?  In a Land Where Paranoia,
Propaganda, and Poverty Are the Norm, an Albino Raccoon Reassures North Koreans That
Good Times Are Ahead. Mother Jones, Vol. 28, No. 3,  May 1, 2003.  P. 52.
8 PPI figures are from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook at
[http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html].  Gross national income at
market prices for South Korea is from World Bank.  World Development Indicators 2003
at [http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2002/tables/table1-1.pdf].
Union dropped from as much as $3 billion to the current $45 million per year.4  This
added to disastrous domestic economic conditions in North Korea.5  Food has been
so scarce that North Korean youth are shorter than those in other East Asian nations.6
Since 1998, the military reportedly has had to lower its minimum height requirement
in order to garner sufficient new recruits.  Life expectancy has been contracting.
With the help of the World Food Program (WFP), which has been feeding more than
a quarter of North Korea’s 22 million people, chronic malnutrition reportedly has
fallen from 62 percent in 1998 to about 42 percent in 2003, while the proportion of
underweight children has dropped from 61 to 21 percent.7  In January 2006,
Pyongyang ordered the WFP to stop food deliveries to the DPRK.
The DPRK’s gross national product in 2003 in purchasing power parity prices
(PPP) — prices adjusted to international levels — has been estimated at $22.85
billion.  This amounts to national income of about $1,000 per capita in PPP values
or roughly the same level as that of Tajikistan, Rwanda, or Kenya and considerably
lower than that of China ($3,920), Indonesia ($2,830), or Mongolia ($1,760), and
dramatically lower than South Korea’s $17,300 in PPP values or $8,910 at market
prices.8  A remarkable fact is that in the mid-1970s, living standards were higher in
North Korea than in China.  Now, North Korea is far behind its rapidly growing
neighbor to the west. 
As shown in Figure 1, growth in estimated real gross domestic product (GDP)
in the DPRK was negative for most of the 1990s before beginning to recover in
1999.  In 2003, growth was just 1.8%, up slightly from 1.2% in 2002.  In essence, the
economy is expanding again but still is below its level in 1990.  In 1990, per capita
gross national income was estimated at $1,142.  It dropped to $573 by 1998 but has
recovered moderately to $818 in 2003.  Agricultural production is back at the 1992
level primarily because of better weather and imports of fertilizer from South Korea.
In this land of scarcity, consumer necessities have been rationed and used to
reward party loyalists.  Under Pyongyang’s economic reforms, this system appears
to be phasing out, but in the fall of 2005, North Korea appeared to be backtracking
on its economic reforms.  It reportedly closed its food markets.  According to South
Korean observers, North Korea classifies its citizens into three ranks and fifty-one
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Figure 1.  Growth in Real GDP in the DPRK,
1990-2003
categories based on their ideological orientation.  The categories are then used to
allocate rations for daily necessities, jobs, and housing.9  The elite in North Korean
society (party cadres who are leaders in the military and bureaucracy) have enjoyed
privileges far above the reach of the average citizen.  While starvation haunts the
provinces, many of the privileged class live in Pyongyang (where provincial North
Koreans cannot enter without special permission); some drive foreign cars, acquire
imported home appliances, reside in apartments on a lower floor (so they do not have
to climb too many stairs when the electricity is out), and buy imported food,
medicines, and toiletries  at special hard currency stores.10  The elite have a strong
vested interest in maintaining the current economic system, despite its problems.
Their incomes originate from the treasury, from foreign investors (mostly South
Korean), remittances from ethnic Koreans in Japan (although these have been
reduced), and the country’s shadowy trade in everything from missile technology to
fake banknotes and narcotics.11  
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16 Current experiments in agriculture are directed from Pyongyang with seven major tasks
that include replacing chemical fertilizers with organic and microbial ones. See Yonhap
(continued...)
Economic Philosophy
The Pyongyang regime has pursued a policy of self-sufficiency and isolation
from the world economy that they call juche or self-reliance.  Juche goes beyond
economics as it has been used since the 1950s to perpetuate power by the central
government and to build an aura of the supernatural around the their supreme leaders
Kim — both father and son.12  While the regime does not emphasize the connection,
the current system of dynastic succession with a paramount father figure also harkens
back to Confucianism and the powerful dynastic tradition that united the Korean
peninsula for hundreds of years.
The economic implications of juche have minimized international trade
relations, discouraged foreign direct investment, and fostered what it considers to be
core industries — mostly heavy manufacturing.  While promoting such heavy
industry, for most of the post-Korean War period, Pyongyang has emphasized the
parallel development of military strength.
Current head of state, Kim Jong-il (often referred to as “Dear Leader”), has
given highest priority to the military.  This places the army ahead of the working
class for the first time in the history of North Korea’s so-called revolutionary
movement.13  Under Kim Il-sung (Kim Jong-il’s father), the juche ideology placed
equal emphasis on political independence, self-defense, and economic self-support
capabilities.  Kim Jong-il, however, insists that North Korea can be a “country strong
in ideology and economy” only when its military is strong.14  The country, therefore,
has been developing its industries within the context of a military-industrial complex
with strong links between heavy industry and munitions production.  Some of North
Korea’s munitions industries (manufacturing dual use products) are virtually
indistinguishable from those supplying civilians.15 
When juche is combined with central planning, a command economy, and
government ownership of the means of production, economic decisions that in a
market economy would be made by private business and farmers have to go through
a few elite in Pyongyang.  These decision makers may or may not understand
advances in agronomy or manufacturing and tend to be motivated by non-economic
factors, such as maintaining political power or avoiding blame for initiatives gone
awry.  Farming methods based partly on crop rotation or new varieties of rice, for
example, may be viewed as too risky.16  Foreign investment also is hindered partly
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News.  N. Korea Eyes China as a Model for Development.  May 11, 2004. 
Source: The Bank of Korea.
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Figure 2.  North Korea’s Industrial 
Structure
because the regime abhors being “exploited” by capitalists who seek to make profits
on their business ventures in North Korea and partly because of their deep-seated
mistrust of Westerners, Japanese, and South Koreans.
As with other isolationist economies in the contemporary world of globalization
and interlinked societies, North Korea has been plagued with the negative effects of
its attempts at self sufficiency: technological obsolescence, uncompetitive exports,
economic privation, and lack of foreign exchange.  These difficulties, together with
advice from China and the demise of the Stalinist economy in Russia, have
compelled the Pyongyang regime to introduce some economic reforms, or what they
refer to as “adjustments.”  To a large extent, they are adopting the Chinese model
with economic reforms preceding any political reforms while eschewing the Russian
model of political reform preceding and concurrent with economic reforms.
Industrial Sectors
North Korea’s industrial sectors are shifting rapidly.  At the end of World War
II, the DPRK represented the industrialized part of the Korean peninsula.  Under
Japanese colonialism, heavy industry, water power, and manufacturing were
concentrated in the North, contrasted with the more agrarian south.  Even in 1990,
49% of the North Korean economy was in mining, manufacturing, and construction,
while 23% was in services (including government and utilities) and 27% in
agriculture.  In recent years, however, the DPRK’s non-military industries have
almost collapsed.  By 1997, mining, manufacturing, and construction had dropped
from 49% to 32% of the economy but in 2003 had risen somewhat to 36%.  In 2003,
services had risen to 37% of the economy, while agriculture has remained fairly
constant at 27%. (See Figure 2.) 
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The drop in the share of manufacturing in GDP has come about largely because
of the rapid decline in production from factories, not because of  large absolute
increases in services or agricultural production.  Reports indicate that factories have
been running at about 30% of their capacity.  The economy lacks food for workers,
raw materials, energy, and foreign currency to buy new equipment and imported
inputs into the manufacturing process.17  Much industrial capital stock is nearly
beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment and shortages of spare parts.
Recently, the government has emphasized earning hard currency, developing
information technology, addressing power shortages, and attracting foreign aid, but
it appears unwilling to do so in any way that jeopardizes its control.  It has initiated
some market-oriented reforms and allowed some liberalization that might bring new
capital and production methods into its factories, but it is a long way from the
reforms that have occurred in other socialist countries.
Some of the most advanced industries in North Korea are associated with its
military.  In 2002, Pyongyang reportedly spent an estimated $14 billion (about 14%
of its annual budget) to maintain its 1.1 million member military.18
 The agricultural sector also is in dire straits.  The economy depends heavily on
collective farms that have been devastated by drought, lack of fertilizers and other
inputs, antiquated farming methods, and a lack of incentives for private production.
A report in 2003 from North Korea indicates that the situation along the border with
China has deteriorated to the point that rates of starvation, disease, and even suicide
are reaching a crisis point.19  The situation arguably would be worse without
international food and other humanitarian aid. 
Economic Reforms
In July  2002, Pyongyang announced a series of economic reforms that some
surmise may mark the beginning of the end of the Stalinist controls over the
economy and the onset of more use of the market mechanism to make economic
decisions, particularly production and consumer purchases.  Although the
government has dubbed the reforms as an “economic adjustment policy,”20 the
actions appear to be a desperate attempt to revive the moribund economy, similar to
what was done in China.  The reforms also dovetail with North Korea’s “military
first” policy.  As Kim Jong-il has given first priority to the military, the rest of the
population has suffered.  This, in turn, has raised pressures on Pyongyang to reform
its economic system.
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The adjustments feature an end to the rationing system for daily commodities
(except for food), a huge increase in prices of essentials and in wages, a major
devaluation of the currency (official exchange rate), abolishment of the foreign
exchange coupon system, increased autonomy of enterprises, authorization of the
establishment of markets and other trading centers, and a limited opening of the
economy to foreign investment.  Prices still remain under centralized control but at
levels closer to those existing in peasant (free) markets. North Korea has not
abandoned the socialist planned economy, but it has been compelled to reform
certain aspects of it.
Under the reforms, overall prices were increased by 10 to 20 times.
Government prices for many essential items, however, rose by much more.  The
price for rice rose by 550 times, for corn 471 times, for diesel oil 38 times, and for
electricity 60 times.  Wages also were raised but not enough to keep pace with
skyrocketing consumer prices.  Wages rose by 18 times for laborers and 20 times for
managers.21  Even though not all workers received the promised wage increases, the
price and wage reforms caused households to face rampant consumer inflation, and
many people ended up worse off financially than before the reforms.
In North Korean factories, reforms include greater control over prices,
procurement, wages, and some incentives to increase profits in order to distribute
them based on individual performance.  The regime also is looking to implement
reforms in agriculture similar to those implemented in China (along the lines of the
rural household contract system).  In the mid-1990s, North Korea’s agricultural work
squads had already been reduced in size.  Now they are moving toward family
oriented operations with farmers allowed to retain more of any production exceeding
official targets.
Although small farmers’ markets have long existed in North Korea, Pyongyang
did not legalize such farmers’ markets until June 2003.  This followed the formal
recognition of commercial transactions between individuals and the 1998 revision
to the constitution that allowed individuals to keep profits earned through legitimate
economic activities.22  Now free markets and shopping centers that use currency, not
ration coupons, are spreading.  The Pyongyang Central Market, for example, is so
crowded that a new, three-story supermarket is slated to open in late 2004.
Pyongyang’s Tongil market with its lines of covered stalls stocked with items such
as fruit, watches, foreign liquor, clothes, Chinese-made television sets, and beer from
Singapore also is bustling with sellers and consumers reminiscent of those in other
Asian countries.23 
In fall 2005, Pyongyang reportedly revived the food rationing system and closed
the food markets that had developed under the reforms.
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The reforms also included opening certain areas to foreign investment.  Under
the Joint-Operation Act of 1984 to 1994, there were 148 cases of foreign investment
worth about $200 million into North Korea.  Of these 148 cases, 131 were from pro-
North Korean residents of Japan.  In 1991, Pyongyang opened the Rajin-Sonbong
free trade zone and established the Foreigner Investment Act.  To 1997, some 80
investments totaled $1.4 million.  Other areas receiving foreign investment include
Nampo, Pyongyang, Kosung-gun, Shimpo, Wonsan, and Mt. Kumkang.  Foreign
companies in North Korea include 50 South Korean companies (e.g. Hyundai,
daewoo, Taechang, LG, Haeju, and G-Hanshin), DHL, ING Bearing Bank; Japan’s
Hohwa, Saga, and New Future Ltd. companies; Taiwan’s JIAGE Ltd.; and the China
Shimyang National Machinery Facility Sales Agency Corporation.24  The U.N.
Development Programme is promoting the Tumen River Valley Development
Project which aims to develop business based on transit transportation, tourism, and
commissioned processing trade.25
Since 2000, the DPRK has attempted to emulate China’s highly successful free
trade zones (FTZ) by establishing the Sinuiju Free trade Zone on the northwestern
border with China along with the proposed Gaesong (Kaesong) FTZ along the border
with South Korea.  The development of the Sinuiju FTZ has been stymied because
of the arrest by Beijing of Chinese entrepreneur Yang Bin who was to head the
project.  The Gaesong FTZ, however, is showing promise.  It is being managed by
the Hyundai Corporation and the especially created Korea Land Corporation and is
located just over the border 43 miles north of Seoul on the route to Pyongyang.  This
810 acre FTZ aims to attract South Korean companies, particularly small and
medium sized enterprises.  Hyundai and the Korea Land Corporation plan to attract
about 850 companies and create 220,000 jobs for North Koreans, but the ultimate
success of the FTZ will depend on access (particularly across the demilitarized zone)
from South Korea, the wage rate for labor (Pyongyang has been pushing for wage
rates higher than those in China or Vietnam), and on the lifting of economic
sanctions on exports from North Korea to American markets.26  Still, more than
1,000 South Korean companies reportedly have expressed interest in moving into the
industrial park, and the two countries have been building a rail link across their
heavily armed border to connect the park with South Korea.27  On June 30, 2004, a
pilot complex at Gaesong was officially completed and is expected to be fully
operating by November.28
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International Trade
Despite North Korea’s isolation and emphasis on juche, it does trade with other
countries.  The foreign economic sector plays an important role for Pyongyang in
that it allows the country to import food, technology, and other merchandise that it
is unable to produce in sufficient quantities at home.  Since North Korea does not
export enough to pay for its imports, it generates a deficit in reported merchandise
trade that must be financed by other means.  Pyongyang has to find sources of
foreign exchange — other than from its overtly traded exports — to pay for the
imports.  Experts surmise that North Korea’s involvement in illicit or questionable
economic activities, particularly illegal drug trade and sales of military equipment,
may be an attempt to generate the foreign exchange necessary to fill this trade gap.29
Detailed data on the country’s external economic relations suffer from
reliability problems similar to those associated with the domestic economy.  The
foreign economic data on actual commercial transactions, however, tend to be the
most accurate since they also are reported by trading partner countries and are
compiled by the International Monetary Fund and United Nations.  Individual
countries, for example, report on their imports from and exports to North Korea.
These data, however, differ from North Korea’s actual annual numbers because of
the time lag in shipping (a product shipped from a country in late December of a year
might not be recorded as arriving in North Korea until the following year), costs of
freight and insurance (North Korean import data may be on a c.i.f. basis that includes
insurance and freight charges that are not included in a country’s export data), and
differences in data gathering methods, coverage, and reporting.  Detailed and reliable
data on trade in military equipment and illegal drugs are notoriously difficult to
obtain and to verify.
South Korea also compiles statistics on trade with North Korea that differ from
its data reported to the United Nations.  South Korea considers trade with the North
as inter-Korean trade, not foreign trade.  The trade amounts it reports to the IMF for
its commercial transactions with the North are considerably lower than the amounts
it reports as inter-Korean trade [available from the Korean Trade-Investment Agency
(KOTRA)].  The South Korean data also include more detail on non-transactional
trade (mostly foreign aid) with North Korea.  IMF data also differ somewhat from
those reported by data vending companies (such as World Trade Atlas).  This report
uses a combination of trade totals from the IMF, partner country data from the World
Trade Atlas, and intra-Korean trade from South Korea’s KOTRA.
The DPRK’s policy of juche, its suspicion of foreign countries, and the collapse
of its industrial production, has resulted in a minimal level of commercial relations
with other nations in the world.  As shown in Table 1, in 2002 it exported $1,274
million in merchandise exports (up from $1,047 million in 2001) while importing
$2,436 million (down from 2001 but up slightly from recent years) for a merchandise
trade deficit of $1,162 million.  Total exports in 2003 appear to have declined
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slightly.  After exports dropped in 1998, they have recovered considerably in recent
years, although they are still quite a bit under their 1990 levels.30 
North Korea’s major trading partners have been China, Japan, South Korea,
Russia, Germany, Brazil, India, Thailand, Singapore, and Hong Kong.  As shown in
Figure 3, North Korea’s major import sources have been China, Japan, South Korea,
Russia, and Germany.  Thailand and India also are becoming major suppliers. (See
Figure 2.)  Major imports by North Korea include machinery, minerals, plant
products, and chemical products.31  In particular, imports of energy materials and
foods reflect Pyongyang’s attempts to remedy these fundamental shortages.




1994 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003*
World 1,039 1,201 965 892 995 1,047 1,274 1,066*
China 181 69 51 42 37 167 271 395 
Japan 328 291 219 203 257 226 234 174 
S. Korea 176 182 92 122 152 176 272 289 
Russia 44 347 8 7 8 15 10 3 
Germany 57 32 24 20 20 21 26 15 
North Korean Imports
1994 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003*
World 1,286 2,055 1,300 1,436 2,047 3,272 2,436 2,049*
China 467 497 357 329 451 571 467 628 
Japan 171 226 175 148 207 1,065 133 92 
S. Korea 18 70 130 212 273 227 370 435 
Russia 70 525 56 48 36 56 47 112 
Germany 59 33 24 32 53 91 148 63 
Balance
of Trade
-247 -854 -335 -544 -1,052 -2,225 -1162 -983 
Source:  S. Korean data from Republic of Korea, KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Agency)
Overseas Offices.  World Trade data from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.
Country data from World Trade Atlas.  World sum is the total North Korean trade plus trade with
South Korea. *World Total for 2003 estimated by KOTRA.
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Figure 3. DPRK Imports by Major Source, 
1994-2002 (in percentage shares) 
Major sources of imports for the DPRK have been China, South Korea, Japan,
Thailand, India, and Russia.  Despite current tensions over Pyongyang’s nuclear
program, imports appear to be growing, even though they are down from 2002.  Fuel
imports from China, and food imports from various countries account for most of the
increases.  Trade with Japan has been decreasing, while trade with South Korea has
increased considerably.
 
Major export markets for the DPRK have been Japan and China with South
Korea developing as a major market following the easing of relations.  (See Figure
4.)  In Europe, Germany has been North Korea’s major trading partner, and in Latin
America, Brazil is developing as a market for North Korea’s exports.  In 2003,
exports to Japan declined — due in part to friction over the DPRK’s admitted
kidnappings of Japanese citizens.  North Korea’s major exports include animal
products, textiles, machinery, electronic products, and base metals.
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Figure 4. DPRK Exports by Major Market
 1994-2002 (in percentage shares)
A recent remarkable development has been North Korea’s increase in exports
of primary products (such as fish, shellfish and agro-forest products) as well as
mineral products (such as base metallic minerals).  Pyongyang reportedly has
imported aquaculture technology to increase production of cultivated fish and
agricultural equipment to increase output of grains and livestock.  It also has
imported equipment for its coal and mineral mines.  Some of this increased output
is being sold abroad to generate foreign exchange to fund imports.32
 
Meanwhile, traditional exports of textiles and electrical appliances have been
declining.  This reflects North Korea’s unstable power supply, lack of raw materials
and components imported from abroad, and the need to ship finished goods to China
or another third country for final inspection.  This diminishing ability of North Korea
to provide a reliable manufacturing platform for the least complicated assembly
operations does not bode well for the country’s future ability to generate the exports
necessary to balance its trade accounts.
Other Sources of Foreign Exchange
North Korea’s $1 billion annual merchandise trade deficit implies that
Pyongyang must be generating that amount in foreign exchange through some means
 — either legal or illegal.  Legal means include borrowing, foreign investments,
foreign aid, remittances from overseas Koreans, selling military equipment not
reflected in trade data, and by selling services abroad.  Illegal methods include the
counterfeiting of hard currency, illegal sales of military equipment or technology,
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sales of illegal drugs, or by shipping illegal cargo between third countries.  The
country also can dip into their foreign exchange reserves.
Legal Sources of Funds
North Korea is able to borrow on international capital markets.  As of December
2003, the country had outstanding bank debt of $246 million (up from $167 million
a year earlier).  This is a relatively small amount, only $11 per capita.  Of the total,
$93 million had a maturity of one year or less, $9 million matured in over two years,
and the rest had maturity undisclosed.  The debts are owed to banks in Germany
($153 million — up from $50 billion in 2002), Italy ($28 million), France ($8
million), Austria ($5 million), and the United Kingdom ($4 million).  Total liabilities
to foreign banks increased by $79 million after declining by $86 million in 2002, and
rising by $154 million in 2001 and by $7 million in 2000.33
International bond issues are not a major source of funds for North Korea.  In
May 2003, the country issued ten-year bonds — the first since 1950 — but since its
sovereign securities are not rated by major Western credit rating agencies, the issue
has generated little interest on international financial markets and is aimed at
domestic investors.  Pyongyang claims that a million people have signed up to
receive the bonds, but many speculate that the deductions from the salaries of North
Korean purchasers in amounts equivalent to four months’ wages to buy the bonds is
not voluntary.34 
Although North Korea is not a major recipient of foreign direct investment
(FDI), in 1997 FDI inflows totaled $307.4 million.  Inflows declined to $30.7 million
in 1998, -$14.9 million in 1999, $5 million in 2000, -$24 million in 2001, and $12
million in 2002.  In 2002, the stock of FDI in North Korea totaled $1,034 million.35
North Korea’s free trade zones, however, are attracting more foreign direct
investment, but so far the actual inflows appear to have been fairly modest.  South
Korea’s Hyundai Corporation, however, secretly paid North Korea nearly $500
million, partly in money borrowed from the South Korean government just a week
before the two nations held a historic summit in June 2000.  This was part of an
estimated billion dollars or more Hyundai was to pay for exclusive rights to engage
in seven major economic projects there.36
A major source of funding for imports into the DPRK has been foreign aid or
direct government transfers.  Both developmental and humanitarian aid and
assistance under KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization,
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created under the 1994 Agreed Framework) to build two light water nuclear reactors
and provide heavy fuel oil have enabled imports into North Korea without financing
from Pyongyang.  North Korea also receives funds in the form of official
development assistance (ODA) from aid donor nations and organizations.  As shown
in Table 2, in 1999, the country received net ODA of $201 million in 1999, $75
million  in 2000, $119 million in 2001, and $267 million in 2002.  Over 2001-2002,
the top donors of gross ODA were the United States ($66 million), the European
Commission ($51 million), Germany ($30 million), Arab Agencies ($9 million), and
the International Fund for Agricultural Development ($6 million).  South Korean aid
to the North is not included in the ODA data.37 
Table 2.  North Korea:  Total Receipts and Official Development
Assistance by Major Source/Donor, 1999-2002
($ in millions)
Total Receipts Net Total ODA Net
1999 2000 2001 2002 1999 2000 2001 2002
U.S. 146.3 1.6 0.3 131.2 146.3 1.6 0.3 131.2
Germany -0.3 -2.4 34.1 35.0 2.9 1.5 27.0 33.2
France 0.7 28.4 12.8 -656.4 0.1 1.7 0.3 0.5
Australia 4.7 7.9 4.8 5.3 4.0 7.1 4.5 2.0
Norway 3.9 4.6 7.9 5.5 3.9 3.3 3.5 3.6
Sweden 4.4 3.5 3.4 4.3 4.4 3.5 3.4 4.3
Switz. -5.8 2.6 6.1 3.4 2.0 2.6 4.5 3.4
EC + EU -0.9 45.0 172.8 -565.5 25.4 34.6 78.0 108.4
Multilateral
Agencies
35.6 48.3 68.1 78.1 35.6 48.3 67.2 77.1
Total 156.7 39.9 190.9 -453.7 200.8 75.2 119.3 266.7
Source:  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.  Source OECD, International
Development Statistics, on-line database.
Note:  Data are from OECD members, multilateral agencies, and 12 other reporting nations not
including South Korea, China, and Russia.   Multilateral Agencies include the U.N.,  International
Fund for Agricultural Development, Arab Agencies, and European Commission.  EC + EU=European
Commission plus European Union member nations.  Total Receipts include ODA + Other Official
Flows + Private Flows.
Since 2000, South Korean government assistance to North Korea has been
running at around $80 million ($87.02 million in 2003).  South Korean civilian
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organizations also provided $71 million in assistance to North Korea in 2003.38  The
United States also provided aid to North Korea beyond what is considered to be
official development assistance.  Total U.S. assistance to the DPRK was $287
million in 1999, $139 million in 2000, $178 million in 2001, and $173 million in
2002 — much of it provided to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization in exchange for North Korea’s pledge to halt its existing nuclear
program.39 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development also compiles
data on total financial flows to North Korea.  These data include Official
Development Assistance (foreign aid excluding that from South Korea) plus other
official flows and private flows.  As shown in Table 2, total net receipts by North
Korea were $157 million in 1999, $40 million in 2000, and $191 million in 2001,
and a negative $454 in 2002.  The negative flow was caused by a net outflow
(probably a loan repayment) of $656 million to France.  In recent years, North
Korea’s total receipts have been less than net ODA inflows because of loan
repayments and other outflows
The United States also has paid North Korea to search for remains of American
servicemen missing from the Korean War.  In 2003, it paid $2.1 million to conduct
four searches.40
Another major source of income for certain North Korean families has been in
remittances from overseas Koreans, particularly those who live in Japan.41  Most of
the North Koreans in Japan either remained there after World War II or are
descendants of those people. Some had been forcibly brought there to work in coal
mines or factories during the 50-year Japanese occupation of Korea.  Currently, of
the approximately 650,000 ethnic Koreans who live in Japan, an estimated 56,000
to 90,000 are from the North Korean area and many are reported to be actively
involved in supporting the Pyongyang regime.  Ethnic Koreans in Japan work in a
variety of businesses, but they face discrimination in Japanese society and are known
for operating pachinko (pinball) parlors and other enterprises providing
entertainment and night life as well as being involved with Japan’s yakuza or
gangsters.  Many of these, as well as managers of North Korean-related credit
unions, regularly send remittances to relatives or associates in North Korea.  One
unusual method of smuggling money to North Korea has been to hide 10,000 yen
bills (worth roughly $90 each) under expensive melons being shipped to Kim Jong-il
as gifts.42
Given the decade of stagnation of the Japanese economy and rising tensions
between Japan and North Korea, these remittances have reportedly been declining.
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A 2003 Japanese newspaper report placed the amount at between $200 million and
$600 million per year, but that figure could be exaggerated.43  In testimony before
parliament, Japan’s Finance Minister stated that in Japan’s FY2002, $34 million had
been sent from Japan to North Korea through financial channels that required reports
to the Japanese government.44  A working estimate would be approximately $100
million per year in such remittances.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that considerable
amounts of currency from Japan are simply carried by individuals on ships and not
reported.  More than 1,000 North Korean freight vessels ply between North Korea
and Japan each year.  Japan, however, has tightened inspections of North Korean
ships.
In summary, the DPRK’s net total receipts plus remittances, aid and
investments from South Korea, and special food and fuel assistance in connection
with negotiations over Pyongyang’s nuclear program, constitute most of the overt
resource inflows that North Korea receives each year over and above its export
earnings.  These amount to perhaps a half billion dollars per year but can be offset
by loan repayments.  North Korea must finance the remainder of its trade deficit —
which is approaching $1 billion — by other means.  It appears that these other means
include exports of military equipment, counterfeiting currency, and trade in illegal
substances.
Illegal or Questionable Sources of Funds
Data on North Korean sales of military equipment abroad is understandably
murky, but the country is thought to have sold hundreds of ballistic missiles to Iran,
Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and other nations in the past decade to earn foreign currency.45
The interdiction by Spain of an unmarked vessel in December 2002 containing parts
for 12 to 15 Scud missiles (valued at about $4 million each) bound for Yemen from
North Korea is one example of such arms sales.46  In testimony before the House
Committee on International Relations, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security pointed out that North Korea possesses Scud and No-
Dong missiles and is developing the Taepo-Dong 2.  He stated that the country is by
far the most aggressive proliferator of missiles and related technologies to countries
of concern.  These sales are one of the North’s major sources of hard currency.47
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According to a U.S. military officer quoted in the Japanese press, North Korea
exported $580 million worth of ballistic missiles to the Middle East in 2001.48
With respect to illegal drug trade, officials from the U.S. military command in
Seoul reportedly said that North Korea is earning between $500 million and $1
billion annually from the narcotics trade.49  North Korea is thought to produce more
than 40 tons of opium per year which would make it the world’s third-largest opium
exporter and sixth-largest heroin exporter.  The regime also is accused of trafficking
in methamphetamine stimulants. U.S. counter-narcotics officials are reported to have
said that since 1976, there have been at least 50 arrests or drug seizures involving
North Koreans in more than 20 countries.  Japanese authorities say that nearly 50%
of illegal drug imports into Japan come from North Korea.50  According to the U.S.
State Department, although such reports have not been conclusively verified by
independent sources, defector statements have been consistent over years and occur
in the context of regular narcotics seizures linked to North Korea.  The State
Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2003 states that
quantity of information and quality of many reports “give credence to allegations of
state sponsorship of drug production and trafficking that can not be ignored.  It
appears doubtful that large quantities of illicit narcotics could be produced in and/or
trafficked through North Korea without high-level party and/or government
involvement, if not state support.”51
In a blatant incident in May 2003, the Australian navy and special forces
commandeered a North Korean ship (Pong Su) off  the country’s southern coast that
allegedly was moving 110 pounds of almost pure heroin valued at $50 million.  The
ship apparently picked up the heroin elsewhere in Asia and took a circuitous route
to Australia.52
Allegations also have been made that North Korea engages in counterfeiting
operations, particularly of U.S. $100 notes. It is believed that the country earns $15
million to $20 million per year in counterfeiting.53
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In the opinion of a North Korean expert at Seoul’s Sejong Institute, “North
Korea’s economy had received a death sentence long ago, but it keeps afloat thanks
to international aid and the country’s trading in weapons and illicit goods.”54
Since late 2005, the United States has taken several measures to reduce illicit
financial activities by North Korea.  On June 28, 2006, President Bush issued
Executive Order 13382 (Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferators and Their Supporters).55  On October 21, 2005, pursuant to Executive
Order 13382, the U.S. Treasury designated eight North Korean entities as
proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.  The action
prohibits all transactions between the designated entities and any U.S. person and
freezes any assets the entities may have under U.S. jurisdiction.56
On September 15, 2005, the U.S. Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia SARL
as a “primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the Patriot Act
because it represents an unacceptable risk of money laundering and other financial
crimes.  Treasury stated that “Banco Delta Asia has been a willing pawn for the
North Korean government to engage in corrupt financial activities through
Macau....”57
U.S.-DPRK Trade Relations
U.S. trade with the DPRK is quite limited.  The United States does not maintain
any diplomatic, consular, or trade relations with North Korea, and the country does
not have normal trade relations (most favored nation) status.  This means that North
Korean exports are subject to the relatively high tariffs existing before World War
II in the United States.  For example, women’s blouses of wool or cotton carry a 90%
import duty if from North Korea but are duty free if from Canada, Israel, or Mexico
or are subject to 9 to 10% duty if from most other nations.  As a communist nation,
North Korea also does not qualify for duty-free treatment of certain products that are
imported from designated developing countries under the generalized system of
preferences program.58  
The United States, moreover, maintains various economic sanctions on North
Korea because it is on the U.S. State Department list of state supporters of
international terrorism, is considered a threat to national security, is a communist
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state, and it proliferates weapons of mass destruction.59  Travel to and trade with
North Korea in other than dual-use goods are allowed if overarching requirements
are met, and there are no restrictions on the amount of money Americans may spend
in the DPRK.  The sanctions related to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction generally target the offending entities.  North Korean assets in the United
States frozen prior to June 19, 2000, remain frozen.  North Korea is on the most
restricted list of countries for U.S. exports (Country Group E list) of items such as
computers, software, national security-controlled items, items on the Commerce
Control List,60 and service or repair of such items.  Economic sanctions on North
Korea, however, are essentially unilateral by the United States.  Most other nations
allow relatively free trade in non-sensitive goods with the DPRK.
The United States uses trade with North Korea as leverage and to send a
message of disapproval for various activities by Pyongyang.  Unless the political
situation between North Korea and the United States is resolved, prospects for
increased bilateral trade are dim.  In addition to high tariffs and trade sanctions, the
United States has blocked North Korea’s admission to membership in international
financial institutions (such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and
Asian Development Bank) which also would allow the DPRK to receive
development assistance that would help finance additional imports from countries
such as the United States.
Table 3 shows U.S. trade with North Korea for 2003.  Of the total U.S. exports
of $8.0 million, most was in food provided as aid.  This was down from U.S. exports
of $25 million in 2002 — also mostly humanitarian and fuel aid.  In FY2003, the
United States provided North Korea 40,200 metric tons of food aid worth $25.5
million.61  Imports from North Korea are nil.
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Table 3.  U.S. Trade by Commodity With the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) in 2004
($ in thousands)
SITC Category U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Balance
Cereals and Cereal Preparations 10,285 0 10,285
Fixed Vegetable Fats and Oils 4,259 0 4,259
Vegetables 3,461 0 3,461
Preparations of Cereal, Flour, starch
or Milk; Bakers Wares 2,459 0 2,459
Dairy Products and Birds’ Eggs 1,157 0 1,157
Misc. Textile Articles 191 0 191
Organic Chemicals 0 1,495 -1,495
Woven Apparel  0 77 -77
Total 23,750 1,495 22,255
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce accessed through World Trade Atlas.
Table 4 shows U.S. merchandise exports, imports, and trade balances with
North Korea since 1990.  Imports have been zero or relatively low with a peak of
$1,495,000 in 2004.  Almost all of these imports from North Korea were organic
chemicals and woven apparel.  A possible concern is that imports of books,
newspapers, and manuscripts have dropped to zero.  For a country with great
strategic importance to the United States, information on North Korea is not flowing
directly into the U.S. market.  U.S. exports at $23,750,000 in 2004 rose from $32,000
in 1990 to $25,012,000 in 2002.  Another peak occurred in 1995 when U.S. exports
totaled $11,607,000.  Of this amount, $10,810,000 was in cereals.  The United States
has been running a small annual surplus in its trade with North Korea, but the food
aid has been provided without cost to North Korea.
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the United States has no direct
investment in North Korea.62  An American company interested in doing business
in North Korea, particularly establishing a company, likely would work through an
overseas subsidiary.  Some American business executives with the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce in South Korea, for example, reportedly travel to North Korea for
business purposes,63 and some U.S. enterprises are working as subcontractors in the
development of North Korea’s Gaeseong industrial complex.64
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Table 4.  U.S. Merchandise Exports, Imports, and Trade
Balances with North Korea, 1990-2003 
($ in thousands)
Year U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Balance
1990 32 0 32
1991 484 10 474
1992 83 0 83
1993 1,979 0 1,979
1994 180 0 180
1995 11,607 0 11,607
1996 541 0 541
1997 2,409 0 2,409
1998 4,454 0 4,454
1999 11,265 29 11,236
2000 2,737 154 2,583
2001 650 26 624
2002 25,012 15 24,997
2003 7,977 0 7,977
2004 23,750 1,495 22,255
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce through World Trade Atlas.
North-South Korean Economic Relations
Economic relations have been a major route for opening relations between
North and South Korea.   Seoul has a major stake in relations with the DPRK and the
outcome of the current Six-Party talks.65  It seeks a “soft landing” for the current
standoff over the North’s nuclear program — one that will lead to a lessening of
tensions and steady integration of North Korea’s economy into the global economic
and financial system.  As with other countries divided by ideology and a history of
hostilities as “pawns” on the chess board of the Cold War, the two halves of the
peninsula face numerous issues to be resolved before they can normalize relations
 — let alone contemplate reunification.
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South Korea has much to gain from a rapprochement with the North.  Its
strategy has been to use its economic leverage to open channels with the North
Korean people while maintaining a credible military deterrent to overt hostile action
by Pyongyang.  South Korea recognizes that essentially it has won the Cold War on
the Korean peninsula, but it recoils at the prospect of funding economic
rehabilitation in the DPRK as was done with East and West Germany.  Seoul also
recognizes that its economic ties are gradually shifting from reliance on the
American market to greater integration with China, Japan, and other countries of
Asia.  Its labor costs are rising, and many of its companies are remaining competitive
only by manufacturing in China and other low-wage markets.  For them, the prospect
of abundant cheap labor just a short distance to the north is appealing and perhaps
less of a potential siren song that the lure of cheap labor in China.
In 2003, total merchandise trade between the two Koreas reached $724 million,
more than double the $333 million just four years earlier.  The largest increases have
been in South Korean exports ($435 million in 2003), although imports also have
risen ($289 million in 2003).  Much of the increase in exports has been in the form
of food and industrial goods.
The major items purchased by South Korea from the North include
food/forestry products, textiles, steel/metal products, and electronics.  The major
South Korean exports to North Korea include chemicals, textiles, machinery,
steel/metal products, and food/forestry products.
Since 1992, particularly under the Sunshine Policy of former South Korean
President Kim Dae Jung and under the Policy for Peace and Prosperity of current
President Roh Moo-hyun, Seoul has permitted its corporations to pursue business
interests in North Korea.  In 2003, the government allowed activities by 89
companies including 35 involved in contract processing (assembly, sewing, or other
processing done under contract) by North Koreans.66  The companies included
Daewoo (jackets, bags), Samsung Electronics (communications center, switchboard),
Samcholi Bicycle, Green Cross (medicine), International Corn Foundation (corn
seeds), Hyundai (Mt. Kumkang tourism, development), and Hanshin Co. (glass)  The
largest project is the Korea Electronic Power Corporation’s work on the construction
of a light water nuclear power plant under  the U.S.-North Korean 1994 Agreed
Framework.67  One global strategy of South Korean businesses is to develop
processing sites in North Korea to take advantage of low labor costs there; in some
cases, labor costs are competitive with those in China.  The two countries also have
taken some halting steps toward linking their economic systems.  In addition to the
business relationships, since September 2002the two countries have been working
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to reconnect the Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) and Donghae (East Sea) railway lines and
adjacent highways.
Table 5.  South Korean Merchandise Trade with North Korea,
1990-2003








1990 12,278 1,188 13,466 -11,090
1991 105,719 5,547 111,266 -100,172
1992 162,863 10,563 173,426 -152,300
1993 178,167 8,425 186,592 -169,742
1994 176,298 18,249 194,547 -158,049
1995 222,855 64,436 287,291 -158,419
1996 182,400 69,639 252,039 -112,761
1997 193,069 115,270 308,339 -77,799
1998 92,264 129,679 221,943 37,415
1999 121,604 211,832 333,436 90,228
2000 152,373 272,775 425,148 120,402
2001 176,170 226,787 402,957 50,617
2002 271,575 370,155 641,730 98,580
2003 289,252 434,965 724,217 145,713
Sources:  South Korea Ministry of Unification, KOTRA.
North Korea depends more on South Korea in international trade than South
Korea does on the North.  North Korea accounts for less than 1% of total South
Korean exports, while North Korean exports to South Korea account for more than
a third of total North Korean exports.  South Korea has access to global markets for
many of its world class industries (automobiles, semiconductors, consumer
electronics, etc.), while North Korea faces restricted markets for its limited array of
exports.
China-DPRK Economic Relations
 China remains North Korea’s chief ally.  In addition to sharing its status as one
of the last communist regimes in the world, China views the Korean peninsula as
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vital to its strategic interests.  Beijing values North Korea as a buffer state68 and
strives to maintain its influence in Pyongyang.  China supplies North Korea with oil,
food, and chemical fertilizers.  The first destination of refugees from North Korea
is usually northeastern China.  Military cooperation between the two countries is
extensive.  In 1961, they signed a mutual defense pact.  In August 2001, Chinese
President Jiang Zemin visited Pyongyang and promised increased humanitarian and
economic assistance.  In April 2004, Kim Jong-il visited Beijing to discuss food aid
and nuclear issues.  China opposes economic sanctions on North Korea and holds
veto power in the United Nations.  In the spring of 2003, China cut off petroleum
shipments for three days through a pipeline connecting the two countries.  Although
Beijing reported the incident was caused by a technical problem, it was widely
interpreted as Beijing’s response to Pyongyang’s nuclear program in a region China
prefers to remain non-nuclear69 and a reminder to Pyongyang of its dependence on
Beijing.  China is hosting and facilitating the ongoing Six-Party Talks that seek a
resolution to the North Korean nuclear problem.
According to Jane’s Information Group, several issues have arisen to cause
friction in the Sino-North Korean relationship.  These include 
! Chinese exasperation at the DPRK’s failure to reform its economy;
! Pyongyang’s prevarication over the nuclear and peace treaty issues
and the consequent dangerous stimulus this provides to proliferation
in the region; 
! The nuclear standoff with the United States and Pyongyang’s claims
to be in possession of nuclear weapons; 
! Growing economic and political rapport between Pyongyang and
Taipei; 
! The North Korean refugee problem on the China-DPRK border;
! Pyongyang’s missile testing, prompting Japan to acquire a Theater
Missile Defense system, with Taiwan wishing to be included; 
! North Korea’s construction of underground missile sites close to the
Chinese border; and
! North Korea’s cavalier attitude towards business. (China
occasionally suspends shipments of humanitarian aid to the DPRK
because Pyongyang regularly ‘forgets’ to return Chinese railroad
rolling stock.)70
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has been the DPRK’s largest
trading partner and supplier of concessional assistance (through subsidized trade and
direct transfers).  China also provides aid directly to Pyongyang.  By bypassing the
United Nations, China is able to use its assistance to pursue its own political goals
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independently of the goals of other countries.  It is widely believed that Chinese food
aid is channeled to the military.  This allows the World Food Program’s food aid to
be targeted at the general population without risk that the military-first policy or
regime stability would be undermined by foreign aid policies of other countries.71
In November 2003, China reportedly transferred responsibility for securing its
border with North Korea from the police to its army.72  Many of China’s two million
ethnic Koreans live along this border, and it is a favorite crossing point for refugees
from North Korea. 
China’s trade with the DPRK is small relative to its trade with South Korea.  In
2003, China (excluding Hong Kong) imported $395 million from North Korea while
exporting $628 million there.  That placed the DPRK as 56th in China’s ranking of
countries both as a source of imports (less than from Equatorial Guinea or Romania)
and destination of exports (less than to Algeria or Burma). Much of China’s trade
with the DPRK goes through the port of Dandong on the Yalu River.  In 2002, 40%
of Chinese exports to and 11% of its imports from North Korea passed through
Dandong.73









1995 63.609 486.037 549.646 422.428
1996 68.638 497.014 565.652 428.376
1997 121.610 534.411 656.021 412.801
1998 51.089 356.661 407.750 305.572
1999 41.722 328.634 370.356 286.912
2000 37.214 450.839 488.053 413.625
2001 166.797 570.660 737.457 403.863
2002 270.863 467.309 738.172 196.446
2003 395.546 627.995 1,023.541 232.448
Sources:  Chinese (PRC excluding Hong Kong) data as supplied by World Trade Atlas.
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China’s major imports from North Korea include fish and seafood; woven
apparel; iron and steel; and miscellaneous grains, seed, and fruits.  China’s major
exports to North Korea include mineral fuels and oil; cereals; electrical machinery;
plastic; machinery; iron and steel; and miscellaneous grains, seed, and fruits.
Japan-DPRK Economic Relations
Although Japan and North Korea have never established official diplomatic
relations, the two nations have maintained significant economic ties for well over a
decade.74  Since the end of the Cold War and until recently, Japan was second only
to China among North Korea’s top trading partners.  Bilateral trade has declined
considerably since the 1980’s, although this has been attributed primarily to the steep
overall downturn of the North Korean economy as much as the state of bilateral
relations.  Japan plays a key role in resolving the current stalemate over North
Korea’s nuclear program because Tokyo can provide considerable economic
assistance to the country and reportedly is ready to write Pyongyang a large check
as compensation for its 50-year occupation once relations between the two countries
are normalized.  Japan also is the expressed target of North Korea’s nuclear weapons
program,75 and the two countries have struggled to resolve the issue of Japanese
citizens kidnapped by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s.
Although Japan is a major trading partner for the DPRK, the DPRK ranks 90th
among the markets for Japan’s exports (less than Slovenia or Kazakhstan) and 57th
among sources of Japan’s imports (less than Sri Lanka or Costa Rica).  Seafood
makes up almost half of the North’s exports to Japan, followed by woven apparel,
vegetables, and electrical machinery.  Japan sends primarily vehicles, electrical
machinery, animal hair/yarn and fabrics, and machinery to North Korea.
Japan’s economic relations with North Korea extend beyond official trade.
Japan has provided 766,000 metric tons of humanitarian food aid to North Korea,
mostly through the United Nations World Food Program.  The pattern of Japanese
aid reflects developments in the political relationship between Tokyo and
Pyongyang; shipments began in 1995 and 1996 when relations warmed and were
suspended after the  Taepodong missile launch over Japan in 1998 and the spy ship
incident in 2001.  
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Table 7.  Japan’s Merchandise Trade with the DPRK, 1994-2003
($ in millions)





1994 328.313 171.092 499.405 -157.221
1995 338.073 253.798 591.871 -84.275
1996 290.745 226.480 517.225 -64.265
1997 301.796 178.942 480.738 -122.854
1998 219.489 175.137 394.626 -44.352
1999 202.564 147.839 350.403 -54.725
2000 256.891 206.760 463.651 -50.131
2001 225.618 1,064.519 1,290.14 838.901
2002 235.840 132.645 368.485 -103.195
2003 174.390 91.445 265.835 -82.945
Source:  Japanese data as supplied by World Trade Atlas.
A group of pro-Pyongyang ethnic Koreans living in Japan known as the Chosen
Soren (Chongryun in Korean) has provided North Korea with additional funds in the
form of cash remittances and, possibly, has facilitated illicit trade such as drug
trafficking and counterfeiting.76  Although the exact amount of remittances is
unknown, the total appears to be in the neighborhood of $100 million per year and
has declined sharply since the economic boom times of the early 1990’s.77  A series
of scandals involving ethnic Korean banks in Japan has revealed that money was
illegally channeled to North Korea through the network of Chosen Soren-affiliated
credit unions.  
Recent developments have dampened political and economic relations between
the two countries.  Kim Jong Il’s admission in fall 2002 that North Korea abducted
several Japanese nationals and the announced advancement of the North’s nuclear
weapons program have hardened public sentiment and official policy towards
Pyongyang.  Tokyo has intensified its monitoring of Chosen Soren’s activities in an
effort to stem support to the Pyongyang regime, as well as imposing far more
stringent inspections on sea links with North Korea.  The Mangyongbong-92
passenger-cargo ferry, suspected of being used by North Korea for clandestine
activities, suspended its regular service for seven months in 2003 due to Japan’s
suddenly strict inspection regime.  From January-July 2003, visits by North Korean
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vessels to Japanese ports were down 25% from the year before.78   In February 2004,
Japan enacted legislation that allows the country to impose economic sanctions on
North Korea without a UN Security Council resolution to that effect.  In June 2004,
the Diet passed a law that enables the country to ban port calls by ships deemed to
pose a security threat.79 
Russia-DPRK Economic Relations
Russian reforms and the end of the Cold War greatly reduced the priority of the
DPRK in the strategy of Russian foreign policy.  Following Soviet support of North
Korea in the Korean War, the USSR provided assistance to Pyongyang that helped
equip its military and create its heavy industrial sector.  In 1998, at the peak of the
bilateral relationship, about 60% of North Korea’s trade was with the Soviet Union.
Much of the trade was in raw materials and petroleum that Moscow provided to
Pyongyang at concessional prices.  Relations between the two cooled in the 1990s
as Russia recognized South Korea, announced that trade with North Korea was to be
conducted in hard currencies, and opted out of its bilateral defense agreement.80
Recently, overall relations between Russia and North Korea have been
improving.  Russia is upgrading its railway connections with North Korea and has
been participating in an ambitious plan to build a trans-Korean railway.  As is the
case with China and South Korea, Russia is critical to North Korean security, since
Russia shares a border with the DPRK, and Russian cooperation would be necessary
to enforce any security guarantee.  As fuel aid from abroad has decreased, moreover,
North Korea has turned again toward Russia as a source of supply.
Still, the DPRK’s trade with Russian lags behind what it has been in the past.
In 2003, North Korea ranked 106th among Russia’s sources of imports (below Jordan
and Liechtenstein) and 65th in terms of markets for Russian exports (below Portugal
and Lebanon).  Russia, however, was North Korea’s sixth largest trading partner.
Major Russian exports to the DPRK include mineral fuels, wood and pulp,
fertilizers, ships/boats, and iron/steel.  The large increase in 2003 came mostly in
refined oil (total exports of mineral fuel oil jumped from $20 million in 2002 to $96
million in 2003).  Pyongyang had to turn to Russia for petroleum, as supplies of fuel
oil from the United States, Japan, and South Korea were curtailed as the six-party
talks bogged down.  Major Russian imports from North Korea include machinery,
electrical machinery, tools/cutlery, and railroad equipment. 
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Exports Total Trade Balance
1994 44.00* 52.00* 96.00* 8.00*
1995 15.00* 70.00* 85.00* 55.00*
1996 347.00* 525.00* 872.00* 178.00*
1997 16.790 72.449 89.239 55.659
1998 8.463 56.497 64.960 48.034
1999 7.208 48.507 55.715 41.299
2000 7.633 35.631 43.264 27.998
2001 14.664 56.099 70.763 41.435
2002 10.317 47.404 57.721 37.087
2003 2.903 112.343 115.246 109.440
Sources: Russian data as supplied by World Trade Atlas.
*1994-96 data from International Monetary Fund.  Direction of Trade Statistics.
U.S. Interests, Strategy, and Policy
The three legs of the grand strategy towards North Korea include economic,
diplomatic, and military means to accomplish U.S. goals and protect U.S. national
interests.  This report examines the economic side of this triad of strategic policy
instruments but also reviews the diplomatic and military aspects of U.S. policy in
order to provide a policy context.
U.S. Interests, Goals, and Strategy
The DPRK threatens several U.S. national interests.  It threatens U.S. security
through its development and potential proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as
other weapons of mass destruction.  North Korea’s missile delivery systems currently
can reach South Korea and Japan and it is reportedly developing a missile (Taep’o-
dong 2) that can reach the continental United States.81  Its conventional forces are
concentrated along the demilitarized zone within striking distance of South Korean
population centers and U.S. forces.  North Korea’s dictatorial, communist, and
oppressive regime headed by Kim Jong-il runs counter to U.S. values of freedom,
liberty, human rights, democracy, and economic choice.
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The National Security Strategy of the United States touches on North Korea
mainly through the following broadly stated goals: (1) to prevent enemies from
threatening the United States, allies, and friends with weapons of mass destruction;
(2) to strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and to work to prevent attacks
against the United States or friendly countries; (3) to work with others to defuse
regional conflicts; (4) to ignite a new era of global economic growth through free
markets and trade; and (5) to champion aspirations for human dignity.82  
As applied to the DPRK, the immediate U.S. goals include (1) to halt or
eliminate North Korea’s development of nuclear or other weapons of mass
destruction; (2) to curtail illegal and questionable activities by North Korea to
include sales of missiles, illegal drugs, counterfeiting of currency, and proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, particularly to terrorist groups; (3) to reduce the
threat of war on the Korean peninsula; (4) to curtail participation by North Korea in
international terrorist activity to include harboring suspected terrorists; and (5) to
induce economic, political, and societal change in the country that could bring about
favorable changes in the Kim regime, governance, and attitudes toward the United
States.
Conventional wisdom with respect to North Korea includes the following
assumptions:  (1) without stringent monitoring mechanisms, Pyongyang probably
will cheat on any agreement; (2) North Korea regularly breaks  international laws or
treaties dealing with activities such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, illicit drug trade, or counterfeiting of currency; (3) economic privation
in North Korea mainly affects the population outside of Pyongyang and only
indirectly affects the military and party leaders, (4) popular sentiment opposing the
current regime is weak or suppressed sufficiently for Kim Jong-il to remain in power
for an indefinite period of time, (5) any U.S. attack on North Korea would result in
an immediate counter-attack on Seoul and other targets in South Korea using existing
conventional weaponry that would cause extensive damage; and (6) any North
Korean use of nuclear bombs on the United States or its allies would trigger
retaliation that likely would destroy Pyongyang, its military installations, and other
targets.
Other factors to be considered include the following: (1) South Korea currently
is pursuing a policy of rapproachment and eventual normalization of relations with
North Korea, although it maintains considerable distrust and hostility toward the
country; (2) among the countries with interest in North Korea, China appears to have
the most influence and economic and political interaction, although ties with Russia
still are strong and South Korea and Japan are major sources of economic assistance
and trade; (3) Japan would likely provide a large monetary settlement to Pyongyang
in return for its years of occupation should a peace settlement be reached; (4) the
border between China and North Korea is porous, particularly in the winter when the
rivers are frozen and electricity so scarce that few lights operate at night; (5)
centrally planned, communist economies, that have been operating for several
decades create distortions and consumer dissatisfaction that enable rapid transition
to a market economy once those economies are liberalized; and (6) economic reform
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and the opening of trade and investment in North Korea would likely induce large
increases in production and economic well-being.
Given U.S. interests and goals, it appears that U.S. strategy may include the
following:  (1) convincing the Pyongyang regime that developing nuclear weapons
decreases, not increases, its security; (2) creating tension within the regime over the
allocation of resources between nuclear and conventional weapons and between the
military and civilian economies; (3) weakening the hold by Pyongyang on the daily
lives of its citizens and support of Kim Jong-il by fostering alternative centers of
power, facilitating the transition to a market economy, and increasing information
flows into the country, (4) depriving the central government of revenues derived
from illicit activities, and (5) using the prospect of greater U.S. cooperation in
combating militant Islam separatist groups in China and Russia  to induce Beijing
and Moscow to apply more pressure on Pyongyang to make suitable concessions in
the Six-Party Talks.
An economic strategy would be to generate interests in and dependency on
international trade, investment, and greater interaction with the outside world that
could weaken the hold by Pyongyang on the daily lives of citizens and bring the
country more into the globalized world.  Such economic liberalization also could
reduce pressures on North Korea to engage in illicit trade in order to cover its trade
deficit and diminish the need for Pyongyang to saber rattle in order to divert
attention from its domestic problems.
Major U.S. policy options, given the above interests, goals, assumptions, and
strategies with respect to the DPRK, include the following: 
! continue current policies of negotiations plus sanctions (continue
Six-Party talks, maintain sanctions, and continue or intensify the
Proliferation Security Initiative with its interdiction of illicit trade
in weapons, drugs, counterfeit currency);
!  intensify negative pressures on the DPRK ( tighten economic
sanctions, restrict trade between North Korea and countries such as
China, Japan, South Korea, and Europe, and discourage foreign
investment in the DPRK); 
! increase engagement to include positive incentives for reform over
the long term (loosen sanctions, encourage reforms, facilitate
foreign investment, promote trade, and allow North Korea to join
the International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank).
Current U.S. Policy
Current U.S. policy with respect to the DPRK includes (1) diplomatic
engagement through the Six-Party talks; (2) non-proliferation efforts, including the
Proliferation Security Initiative; (3) international efforts to counter trafficking by
North Korea in illegal drugs, counterfeit currency, or other contraband; (4)
maintenance of U.S. military forces in South Korea, Japan, and elsewhere in the
Pacific as a credible deterrent against North Korean aggression; (5) economic
sanctions and diplomatic isolation; (6) keeping North Korea on the U.S. list of
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terrorist states, and (7) keeping North Korea from joining  international financial
institutions. The 1994 Framework Agreement to provide two light-water nuclear
reactors and heavy fuel oil in exchange for North Korea’s halt in its heavy-water
nuclear generating plant and development of nuclear weapons is now on hold and,
unlikely to be resurrected, according to many observers.
Although current U.S. policy is still a work in progress, it has not deterred
North Korea from continuing its nuclear weapons program, has not visibly weakened
the Kim regime, has not eased tensions in the Korean peninsula, and seems not to
have induced greater regard by Pyongyang for human rights or democracy.  It has,
however, provided a mechanism for greater security cooperation in the region by
compelling the five nations meeting with the DPRK in the Six-Party Talks to consult
more extensively on security matters.  Some have surmised that the lack of U.S.
criticism of either Russian actions against militant Islamist separatists in Chechnya
or China’s actions against Islamic separatists in its Muslim Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region indicates that the United States has traded its vocal concern for
human rights violations of the separatists for cooperation in resolving the North
Korea problem and support for the global war on terrorism.
With respect to nuclear weapons, while the 1994 Framework Agreement was
being observed, North Korea did close down its heavy water nuclear plant and allow
the spent fuel rods to be sealed and inspected by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).  However, it violated the Agreement (and another agreement to
keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear free) by reportedly embarking on a separate
program to enrich uranium.  North Korea, subsequently, expelled the IAEA
inspectors, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement, and on October
2, 2003, claimed (so far unsubstantiated) that it had completed reprocessing 8,000
spent fuel rods and was using the plutonium to make nuclear bombs.83  Pyongyang,
however, has yet to test or deploy a nuclear weapon. 
North Korea claims that the reasons for its nuclear program are to deter an
attack by the United States and to use them if South Korea starts a war or to
devastate Japan to prevent the United States from participating in such a war.84  The
nuclear program also enables it to gain international prestige, to exercise a degree of
hegemony over South Korea, and to extract economic assistance from other
countries.  Pyongyang is unlikely to abandon this nuclear program without
significant changes to the underlying reasons for its existence.  Its fear of being
attacked has been exacerbated by its inclusion in the “axis of evil,” the Bush doctrine
of preemptive strikes, and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.85  Some also consider
Pyongyang’s nuclear program to be a bargaining chip to be traded for economic
assistance and to gain international recognition.
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Economic sanctions have brought few concrete results.  The sanctions have
primarily been American.  North Korea continues to trade with other countries as
well as to receive humanitarian food aid and limited foreign investment.  Even the
United States attempts to keep humanitarian aid separate from political
considerations.  The policy questions with respect to sanctions are whether economic
sanctions have actually worsened economic conditions in North Korea and whether
the poor economic conditions have changed policies in Pyongyang.
It appears that despite deep privation and negative growth during the mid-
1990s, the sanctions seem to have had little effect on Pyongyang’s behavior in ways
that would achieve U.S. ends.  The ruling elite and military have first priority on
scarce food and other supplies.  The Kim regime allots economic privileges to its
insiders.  Peasants may starve, but ranking communist party members live in a
separate world of relative luxury.86  The poor economic conditions also do not appear
to have materially undermined the Kim regime.  Experts consider internal dissident
forces too weak and Kim’s control over his military too strong for a domestic coup
to occur.87  Pyongyang has taken halting steps toward opening its economy to
international investment and has allowed more private markets, but these are similar
to policies nearly all centrally planned economies are taking, and China and Russia
have been recommending that North Korea adopt them also.
Irrespective of whether the U.S. economic sanctions worsened North Korea’s
economy, the poor state of the North Korea’s agriculture and industries has indirectly
affected U.S. national interests.  It has necessitated humanitarian aid and has
generated a deficit in trade that Pyongyang has attempted to fill by dealing in illegal
drugs and missiles.  Food scarcity also has pushed numerous refugees into China and
South Korea. 
In terms of non-proliferation, the Proliferation Security Initiative has passed its
first anniversary and now has more than 60 governments participating.  Although
aimed at stopping trade in weapons of mass destruction and their components, the
prospect of ships being inspected complicates North Korean efforts to smuggle illicit
weapons, drugs, and counterfeit currency.88
With respect to North Korea and terrorism, the United States has kept North
Korea on its list of terrorist states primarily because of past terrorist activity.  The
blowing up of an airliner with South Korean government officials on board and the
harboring of Japanese Red Army members from the 1960s are the two primary
reasons for keeping the DPRK on the terrorist list.  The United States apparently has
CRS-36
89 Pike, John.  GlobalSecurity.org.  DPRK, Nuclear Developments 2004.
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke2004.htm]
assured Japan that North Korea will remain on the terrorist list until it completely
resolves the kidnapping issue with Japan.  Being on this list requires the United
States to impose certain trade restrictions.
The Six-Party Talks
Current engagement with North Korea is being conducted under the Six-Party
Talks plus bilateral discussions between Pyongyang and other nations.  The Talks
include the United States, DPRK, China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia.  This
brings all major players to the table, exposes China and Russia to North Korean
obstinacy, enables China and Russia to exert pressure on Pyongyang, and includes
Japan and South Korea who have direct interests in a peaceful resolution of the
problem and are likely to be the major providers of aid to the DPRK. 
This report examines the major economic policy options that could be offered
in the current negotiations.  In the third round of talks (held in Beijing in June 2004),
the negotiated package being considered reportedly includes a multi-nation security
assurance plus economic assistance (particularly fuel aid) for the DPRK in exchange
for a verifiable dismantling of or a halt to its nuclear program. (For discussion of the
talks, see CRS Issue Brief IB98045,  Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations — Issues for
Congress, by Larry Niksch.)
On June 23, 2004, the U.S. delegates at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing
reportedly presented a practical series of steps to achieve the complete, verifiable and
irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear program. Under the
proposal, the five nations would give North Korea energy aid and a security
guarantee in exchange for ending its nuclear program (a detailed implementation
plan of disabling, dismantlement, and elimination of all nuclear-related facilities and
materials, centrifuge and other nuclear parts, fissile material and fuel rods, and a
long-term monitoring program).  If North Korea agrees to the proposal, the United
States is to take steps to ease North Korea’s political and economic isolation.  The
U.S. proposal would give North Korea three months to prepare for the eventual
comprehensive dismantling of its nuclear programs.  During that time, Washington
would allow other nations to supply the North with much needed fuel oil. The United
States is also prepared to give diplomatic rewards, such as starting the process of
lifting sanctions against Pyongyang.  In exchange for its concessions, the United
States wants North Korea to provide a full listing of its nuclear activities, allow
monitoring of its atomic operations, and disable dangerous materials over the
three-month period before actual dismantling begins. The United States itself would
not provide any benefits short of an agreement for the complete, verifiable and
irreversible dismantlement of the program. The United States did agree to replace the
term, “CVID,” which North Korea objects to, with a new term, “comprehensive
denuclearization,” but the new term reflects the CVID requirements. The term
“nuclear freeze” is favored by North Korea, which is not prepared for complete
dismantlement in the initial phase.89
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Alternatively, some have opposed the Six-Party Talks and prefer that the United
States pursue a hard-line policy toward North Korea — not make any concessions
and even tighten economic sanctions — in the hope that the North Korean regime
will collapse.  Neither China nor South Korea, however, would welcome a collapse
of the North Korean economy along with the subsequent refugee and other problems
it would generate.  As can be seen by the above review of DPRK international trade
and other economic flows, an economic collapse seems unlikely as long as nations
continue to provide trade opportunities and humanitarian assistance to North Korea.
Table 9 summarizes the major negotiating priorities and bargaining chips for
each side in the Six-Party talks.  Any policy package would have to address at least
some of the priorities of each nation.
The highest priority for the United States, Japan, and Russia reportedly is for
North Korea to scrap its nuclear weapons program in a manner that is verifiable.
(Analysts contend that nuclear states tend to come in pairs — one new state will
generate another.  The existence of even a few nuclear weapons in Pyongyang will
generate pressures for Japan and South Korea to follow.)  Japan also is concerned
about North Korean missiles (which have been fired over Japan) and a full
accounting for the abduction of its citizens.  In addition, the United States, China,
and Japan seek a stop to weapons proliferation, while also Japan seeks normalization
of relations and South Korea seeks a framework for rapprochement, possible
reunification with the North, less military tension along the demilitarized zone
(DMZ), and access to cheap labor and markets in the North.
Table 9.  Major Priorities and Bargaining Chips by Country in
the Six-Party Talks with North Korea
Country Priority Bargaining Chips
United
States
Complete, verifiable, and irrevocable






Guarantee security and regime; establish
diplomatic relations with the U.S. and
Japan; reunification with South Korea on
own terms





Set framework for peaceful resolution and
prosperity on the peninsula; reunification;
access to North Korean labor and markets
Economic support
Japan Scrap nuclear weapons program and




China Non-nuclear Korean peninsula, non-
proliferation; continued influence on
peninsula
Economic support
Russia Scrap N. Korean nuclear weapons; promote
stability in N.E. Asia
Buffer diplomacy
Source:  Adapted from:  The Seoul Economic Daily, 22 August 2003, cited in Hong Soon-Jick, “North
Korean Nuclear Crisis:  Prospects and Policy Directions,” East Asian Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, Autumn
2003, p. 31.
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Pyongyang’s primary goals appear to include (1) preservation of communist
rule under Kim Jong-il, (2) obtaining a security guarantee that would preclude a
possible preemptive attack by the United States or its allies, (4) maintaining key
elements of its nuclear weapons programs, (3) establishing diplomatic relations with
the United States and Japan, (4) reunification with the South on its own terms, and
(5) obtaining economic assistance for its ailing economy while  maintaining its juche
philosophy.  The Kim regime appears to be operating under the assumption that
because of its designation as a member of the “axis of evil” by the Bush
Administration, it has a high probability of being targeted for military action based
on the Iraq precedent.
One policy package has been proposed by Michael O’Hanlon and Mike
Mochizuki.  Their “Grand Bargain,” would require the DPRK to:  (1) provide
complete and verifiable denuclearization under International Atomic Energy Agency
and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty auspices; (2) end the development, production,
deployment, and stockpiles of its medium- and long-range missiles; (3) reduce its
conventional forces (by about 50%); (4) return Japanese kidnapping victims; (5) sign
biological and chemical weapons conventions; (6) end counterfeiting and drug
trafficking activities, and (7) establish diplomatic ties with South Korea.90  The
United States would provide economic assistance.  This combines positive and
negative incentives that cover a range of interests on both sides.  Other policy
options include exercising a military option91 as well as various combinations of
deterrent, coercive, and co-optive measures.92 
A risk of any policy package is that North Korea might not agree to scrap its
nuclear program or agree and then cheat again.  In that case, tensions would escalate,
and options such as sabotage of the Yongbyon nuclear facility or a preemptive
invasion could be considered.93  Absent those extreme measures, the world may have
to learn to live with a nuclear-armed North Korea much as it has learned to live with
a nuclear-armed Pakistan and India.  Japan and South Korea would have to consider
whether to develop nuclear capability themselves.  Another risk is that the United
States would be perceived as being blackmailed and giving too much away to a
dictator who regularly violates the human rights of his people.
The costs of a diplomatic solution to tensions with North Korea would be
relatively small compared with a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia or a preemptive
strike on North Korea by the United States.  Because the United States, Japan, South
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Korea, and the European Union already have agreed to fund the provisions of the
1994 Agreed Framework, funds for fuel oil presumably would be made available.
Opening trade and diplomatic relations would be of relatively low cost for the United
States.  
Possible Economic Incentives 
In addition to the security side of the Six-Party Talks, the negotiating package
could include any of the following economic incentives.  In the absence of an
agreement under the talks, any of the following can be — and by some parties to the
talks are being — pursued independently. 
Normalizing Diplomatic Relations.  Normalization of diplomatic relations
with the DPRK would apply to the United States, Japan, and South Korea.  North
Korea already has diplomatic relations with China, Russia, and the European Union
(including an embassy in London).  For Japan, the DPRK would have to resolve
certain issues, including a full accounting of the status of kidnapped Japanese
citizens, North Korea’s missile firings over Japan, and incursions by suspected
DPRK espionage and drug-running ships into Japanese waters.  Upon conclusion of
these normalization talks, Japan is likely to offer $5 billion to $10 billion to North
Korea in compensation for its occupation.94
Normalizing diplomatic relations allows countries to communicate with each
other in a more direct fashion, enables diplomats to gather information directly, and
provides more interaction on a personal level.  Normalized relations can help to
overcome the Pyongyang propaganda machine both within the DPRK and on the
world stage.  For the United States, if relations are not normalized, Washington can
seek a solution similar to that with Cuba whereby in the absence of diplomatic ties,
the U.S. mission is attached to that of Switzerland and maintains a staff similar in
size to a regular embassy.  (North Korea has been a member of the United Nations
since 1991 and has representatives in New York.)  Japan has initiated talks with
Pyongyang that could lead to normalized relations, and South Korea has been
seeking diplomatic ties and possibly some form of reunification.
Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the United States and the DPRK
announced their intention to open liaison offices in each other’s capitals and
establish full diplomatic relations if the two governments could make progress on
issues of concern to each side.  This was not completed.
Negotiating a Trade Agreement.  The United States could begin talks with
the DPRK on a trade agreement which would cover goods, services, and investments
and could be modeled after the 2001 bilateral trade agreement concluded between
the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.95  Upon implementation of
the trade agreement, each country would accord the other normal trade relations
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(most favored nation) status.  The immediate effect would be to allow North Korean
exports to the United States to enter at the lower rates of duty accorded to nearly all
other nations of the world.  The trade agreement also could cover investment and
other U.S. interests. 
While the DPRK’s market currently is small, eventually it could re-industrialize
and become a larger economic player in the region.  Liberalization of North Korean
trade and investment relations, moreover, can work through the economy in the same
way that it did in China and Russia by exposing the public to the benefits of
increased wealth.  The major negative to establishing trade with North Korea is that,
unless it is part of a larger package that includes other concessions, the United States
could be viewed as exchanging an important bargaining chip for minimal gain.
Easing U.S. Sanctions.  The United States could ease economic sanctions
on North Korea if the country resolves the issues that caused the sanctions to be
imposed initially.  Since North Korea’s other trading partners have more liberal trade
with North Korea, it is mainly American companies and traders that are impacted by
the sanctions.  Pyongyang can spend its available foreign exchange in any of a
number of world markets — in China, Japan, South Korea, Europe, or elsewhere.
Moreover, as North Korea opens its economy, U.S. businesses would be able to
decide whether or not to invest there based on their own economic interests and not
because they are precluded from doing so by U.S. law. 
Conversely, the United States could take the issue to the United Nations and
attempt to widen the sanctions.  However, this would face a likely veto by China and
Russia.  Washington also could pressure Japan or South Korea to reduce economic
ties to North Korea.
Allowing the DPRK to Join International Financial Institutions (IFIs).
The United States could stop blocking the DPRK from joining the major IFIs,
particularly the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and International Monetary
Fund.  Pyongyang is particularly interested in joining the Asian Development Bank,
but IFI procedures require membership first in the International Monetary Fund.  The
IMF requires certain economic data which the World Bank or Asia Development
Bank needs to evaluate projects and loan requests.  Membership in IFIs requires that
a country establish data gathering and reporting mechanisms as well as open their
country to visits, surveys, or assessments by the IFI.  As an incentive, a special fund
could be set up in the World Bank or Asian Development Bank to assist North Korea
in its economic transition.  This fund could be financed by Japan or South Korea in
conjunction with their normalization of relations with the DPRK.
Removing the DPRK from the Terrorism List.  The United States, Japan,
and the DPRK could commence negotiations to remove the DPRK from the U.S.
State Department’s list of nations that support or sponsor international terrorism.
Removal from the list would require Congressional concurrence.  Once off this list,
North Korea would become eligible for U.S. foreign aid, loans from the U.S. Export-
Import Bank, loans from international financial organizations in which it has
membership, and an easing of U.S. export control requirements. In order to be
removed from this list, it appears that the DPRK would have to do the following:  (1)
issue a written guarantee that it no longer is engaged in terrorism; (2) provide
evidence that it has not engaged in any terrorist act in the past year; (3) join
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international anti-terrorism agreements; and (4) address issues of past support of
terrorism (particularly the harboring of Japanese Red Army terrorists and kidnapping
of Japanese citizens).96
Fuel and Food Aid
In the Six-Party Talks, since the DPRK appears to be most concerned with
obtaining fuel and food aid in exchange for concessions on its nuclear program, the
United States could provide assistance in any of a variety of forms.  North Korea is
insisting that the U.S. side provide fuel aid as part of any package settlement as
evidence of the depth of their commitment.  Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the
United States was committed to provide North Korea with 500,000 metric tons of
heavy oil each year until the first of two light water reactors being built became
operational. These oil shipments were terminated in 2002.
Legislative Action
Major congressional action with respect to security aspects of U.S.-DPRK
relations is included in CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons
Program, by Larry A. Niksch.
